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Abstract: Medical data is frequently quite sensitive in terms of data privacy and security. Federated
learning has been used to increase the privacy and security of medical data, which is a sort of machine
learning technique. The training data is disseminated across numerous machines in federated learning, and the learning process is collaborative. There are numerous privacy attacks on deep learning
(DL) models that attackers can use to obtain sensitive information. As a result, the DL model should
be safeguarded from adversarial attacks, particularly in medical data applications. Homomorphic
encryption-based model security from the adversarial collaborator is one of the answers to this
challenge. Using homomorphic encryption, this research presents a privacy-preserving federated
learning system for medical data. The proposed technique employs a secure multi-party computation
protocol to safeguard the deep learning model from adversaries. The proposed approach is tested in
terms of model performance using a real-world medical dataset in this paper.
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1. Introduction

https://doi.org/10.3390/

Machine learning (ML) is a widely used technique in almost all fields, where a computer system can learn from data to improve its performance. This technique is widely used
in many application areas such as image recognition, natural language processing, and
machine translation. Federated learning is a machine learning technique where the training
data is distributed across multiple machines, and the learning process is performed in a
collaborative manner [1]. This technique can be used to improve the privacy and security
of medical data [2].
Medical data is highly sensitive and is often subject to data privacy and security
concerns [3]. For example, a person’s health information is often confidential and can
be used to identify the person. Thus, it is essential to protect the privacy and security
of medical data. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) (US
Department of Health and Human Services, 2014) and General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) (The European Union, 2018) strictly mandate personal health information privacy.
There are various methods to safeguard the private information. Federated learning is one
of the techniques that can be utilized for the protection of sensitive data during multi-party
computation tasks. This technique can be used to improve the privacy and security of
medical data by preventing the data from being centralized and vulnerable.
Keeping the data local is not sufficient for the security of the data and the ML model.
However, there are several privacy attacks on deep learning models to get the private
data [4,5]. For example, the attackers can use the gradient information of the deep learning
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model to get the sensitive information. Thus, the deep learning model itself should be protected from the adversaries as well. One of the solutions for this problem is homomorphic
encryption-based model protection from the adversary collaborator. Homomorphic encryption is a technique where the data can be encrypted, and the operations can be performed
on the encrypted data [6]. This technique can be used to protect the deep learning model
from the adversaries.
This paper proposes a privacy-preserving federated learning algorithm based on a
convolutional neural network (CNN) for medical data using homomorphic encryption.
The proposed algorithm uses a secure multi-party computation protocol to protect the
deep learning model from the adversaries. We evaluate the proposed algorithm using a
real-world medical dataset and show that the proposed algorithm can protect the deep
learning model from the adversaries. We limited our work to binary classification. In our
subsequent work, we plan to use multi-class approaches in the literature [7,8].
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
•

•
•
•

A recent European Data Protection Board (EDPB) Public Consultation stated the use of Secure Multi-Party Computation as an additional measure to the General Data Protection Regulation’s (GDPR) Article 46 transfer tools. Here, we provide a method to implement practically secure multi-party computation in federated learning to improve the privacy and
security of medical data (https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/webform/public_
consultation_reply/inpher-_edpb_supplementary_measures_comment.pdf (27 June 2022)).
A homomorphic encryption-based federated learning algorithm is proposed to protect
the confidentiality of the sensitive medical data.
A secure multi-party computation protocol is proposed to protect the deep learning
models from the adversaries.
A real-world medical dataset is used to evaluate the proposed algorithm. The experimental results show that the proposed algorithm can protect the deep learning model
from the adversaries.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes related work,
while Section 3 describes the preliminaries, including homomorphic encryption and federated learning. Section 4 provides detailed information of the proposed system model.
Sections 5 and 6 discuss the results, while Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Related Work
Data-driven ML models provide unprecedented opportunities for healthcare with the
use of sensitive health data. These models are trained locally to protect the sensitive health
data. However, it is difficult to build robust models without diverse and large datasets
utilizing the full spectrum of health concerns. Prior proposed works to overcome this
problem include federated learning techniques. For instance, the studies [9–11] reviewed
the current applications and technical considerations of the federated learning technique
to preserve the sensitive biomedical data. The impact of federated learning is examined
through the stakeholders, such as patients, clinicians, healthcare facilities, and manufacturers. In another study, the authors in [12] utilized federated learning systems for brain tumor
segmentation on the BraTS dataset, which consists of magnetic resonance imaging brain
scans. The results show that performance is decreased by privacy protection costs. The
same BraTS dataset is used in [13] to compare three collaborative training techniques, i.e.,
federated learning, institutional incremental learning (IIL), and cyclic institutional learning
(CIIL). In IIL and CIIL, institutions train a shared model successively, where CIIL adds a
cycling loop through organizations. The results indicate that federated learning achieves
similar Dice scores to that of models trained by sharing data. It outperforms the IIL and
CIIL methods since these methods suffer from catastrophic forgetting and complexity.
Medical data is also safeguarded by encryption techniques such as homomorphic
encryption. In [14], authors propose an online secure multi-party computation sharing
patient information to hospitals using homomorphic encryption. Bocu et al. [15] proposed
a homomorphic encryption model that is integrated with a personal health information sys-
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tem utilizing heart rate data. The results indicate that the described technique successfully
addressed the requirements for secure data processing for the 500 patients with expected
storage and network challenges. In another study by Wang et al. [16], a data division
scheme based on homomorphic encryption for wireless sensor networks was proposed.
The results show that there is a trade-off between resources and data security. In [17], the
applicability of homomorphic encryption is shown by measuring the vitals of the patients
with a lightweight encryption scheme. Sensor data such as respiration and heart rate are
encrypted using homomorphic encryption before transmitting to the non-trusting third
party, while encryption takes place only in a medical facility. The study in [18] developed an IoT-based architecture with homomorphic encryption to combat data loss and
spoofing attacks for chronic disease monitoring. The results suggest that homomorphic
encryption provides cost-effective and straightforward protection of the sensitive health
information. Blockchain technologies are also utilized in cooperation with homomorphic
encryption for the security of medical data. Authors in [19] proposed a practical pandemic
infection tracking tool using homomorphic encryption and blockchain technologies in
intelligent transportation systems using automatic healthcare monitoring. In another study,
Ali et al. [20] developed a search-able distributed medical database on a blockchain using
homomorphic encryption. The increase need to secure sensitive information leads to the
use of various techniques together. In the scope of this study, a multi-party computation
tool using federated learning with homomorphic encryption is developed and analyzed.
3. Preliminaries
3.1. Homomorphic Encryption
The definition of the homomorphic encryption (HE) scheme is given in [21] as follows:
Definition 1 (Homomorphic Encryption). A family of schemes {Ek }k∈Z+ is said to be homomorphic with respect to an operator ◦ if there exist decryption algorithms {Dk }k∈Z+ such that for
any two ciphertexts c1 , c2 ∈ C , the following equality is satisfied:

Dk (Ek (m1 , r1 ) ◦ Ek (m2 , r2 )) = m1 ◦ m2 , ∀m1 , m2 ∈ M,

(1)

where r1 , r2 ∈ R are the corresponding randomness.
A homomorphic encryption scheme is a pair of algorithms, Enc and Dec, with the
following properties:
•
•
•

Enc takes as input a plaintext m ∈ Z N , and outputs a ciphertext c such that c is a
homomorphic image of m, i.e., Dec(c) = m;
Dec takes as input a ciphertext c, and outputs a plaintext m such that m is a homomorphic image of c;
Enc and Dec are computationally efficient.

There are two types of homomorphic encryption: additively homomorphic and multiplicatively homomorphic.
Additively homomorphic encryptionconsists of a pair of algorithms Enc and Dec
such that, for all m1 , m2 ∈ Z N , c1 = Enc(m1 ),c2 = Enc(m2 ), and c3 = c1 + c2 , we have
Dec(c3 ) = m1 + m2 .
Multiplicatively homomorphic encryption consists of a pair of algorithms Enc and
Dec such that, for all m1 , m2 ∈ Z N , c1 = Enc(m1 ),c2 = Enc(m2 ), and c3 = c1 c2 , we have
Dec(c3 ) = m1 m2 .
Partially homomorphic encryption is a variant of homomorphic encryption where
homomorphism is only partially supported, i.e., the encryption scheme is homomorphic
for some operations while not homomorphic for others.
Somewhat homomorphic encryption is a variant of fully homomorphic encryption
where homomorphism is only limited supported, i.e., the encryption scheme is homomorphic for all operations for a limited number of operations.
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Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) is a variant of homomorphic encryption which
allows for homomorphism over all functions, i.e., the encryption scheme is homomorphic
for all operations. In other words, an FHE scheme consists of a pair of algorithms Enc and
Dec such that, for all m1 , m2 ∈ Z N , c1 = Enc(m1 ),c2 = Enc(m2 ), and c3 = c1 c2 , we have
Dec(c3 ) = m1 m2 .
Table 1 shows a summary of the major homomorphic encryption schemes.
Table 1. Major homomorphic encryption schemes.

Scheme

Key-Size

Additive/Multiplicative

Partially/Somewhat/Fully

Paillier
ElGamal
BFV
CKKS
FV

2048 bits
1024 bits
2048 bits
2048 bits
2048 bits

Additive
Additive
Additive, Multiplicative
Multiplicative
Multiplicative

Partially
Partially
Somewhat
Somewhat
Somewhat

3.2. Brakerski–Fan–Vercauteren (BFV) Scheme
Since the work of Brakerski, Fan, and Vercauteren (BFV), the somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE) scheme has become one of the most important research topics in
cryptography. In this section, we give the definition of this scheme.
Definition 2 (BFV scheme). An SHE scheme E is said to be in the BFV family of schemes if it
consists of the following three algorithms:
•
•
•

Key generation algorithm: It takes the security parameter k as input, and outputs a public key
pk and a secret key sk.
Encryption algorithm: It takes the message m ∈ M, a public key pk, and a randomness r ∈ R
as inputs, and outputs a ciphertext c ∈ C .
Decryption algorithm: It takes a ciphertext c ∈ C , a secret key sk, and an integer i ∈ Z+ as
inputs, and outputs a message m ∈ M.

Remark 1. In the above definition, the integer i is called the decryption index. It is introduced
to allow for efficient decryption of ciphertexts that are the result of homomorphic operations. For
example, when the ciphertext c1 is the result of homomorphic operations on ciphertexts c2 and c3 ,
that is, c1 = c2 ◦ c3 , then c1 can be decrypted by taking the decryption index i = 2.
In the following, we give a brief description of the BFV scheme.
The key generation algorithm of the BFV scheme consists of the following two steps.
1.

2.

Let t be the security parameter. For a positive integer t, define a number n = bb(t)c
and a positive integer p where b : Z+ → Z+ is a polynomial, and p is a prime number
satisfying p > 2n .
Let d be a positive integer such that d < p. Choose a monic polynomial f ( x ) of degree
d with f ( x ) ≡ x − ã (mod p) for some ã ∈ Z p . Let T ( x ) = x n f ( x ) (mod p). Choose
n
a quadratic nonresidue b of Z p , and let L( x ) = T ( x )bx 2 (mod p).

Let q = 2nL(0). The secret key sk is chosen to be a nonnegative integer s less than q.
The public key pk is chosen to be the sequence ( p, T ( x ), L( x ), n, q).
The encryption algorithm of the BFV scheme consists of the following three steps.
1.
2.
3.

Let pk = ( p, T ( x ), L( x ), n, q) be the public key. Choose a random polynomial R( x ) ∈
Z p [ x ] of degree less than d.
Given a message m ∈ Z p , compute u( x ) = m + 21 R( x )2 L( x )−1 (mod p).
Choose a random integer t̃ ∈ Z p , and output the ciphertext c = (t̃, u( x )).
The decryption algorithm of the BFV scheme consists of the following two steps.

1.

Let sk = s be the secret key. Compute v( x ) = L( x )−1 (s + 21 T ( x )2 b−1 x n ) (mod p).
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2.

Given a ciphertext c = (t̃, u( x )), compute m = u( x ) − 12 v( x )2 (mod p).

Remark 2. In the BFV scheme, the message space is M = Z p .
3.2.1. Homomorphic Operations
Additive Homomorphism
In the BFV scheme, the additive homomorphism is defined as follows:
Definition 3 (Additive homomorphism). Let c1 = (t̃1 , u1 ( x )) and c2 = (t̃2 , u2 ( x )) be two
ciphertexts. The additive homomorphism is defined to be the ciphertext c1 + c2 = (t̃1 + t̃2 , u1 ( x ) +
u2 ( x )).
Remark 3. In the BFV scheme, the standard polynomial addition algorithm implements the additive
homomorphism.
Multiplicative Homomorphism
In the BFV scheme, the multiplicative homomorphism is defined as follows:
Definition 4 (Multiplicative homomorphism). Let c1 = (t̃1 , u1 ( x )) be a ciphertext and
m ∈ Z p be a message. The multiplicative homomorphism is defined to be the ciphertext c1 · m =
(t̃1 · m, u1 ( x ) · m).
Remark 4. In the BFV scheme, the standard polynomial multiplication algorithm implements the
multiplicative homomorphism.
Remark 5. The multiplicative homomorphism is sometimes called the “plaintext multiplication”
or the “scalar multiplication”.
3.2.2. Relinearization
Relinearization is a homomorphic operation used in the BFV scheme to reduce the
number of ciphertexts generated by homomorphic operations. In the following, we give
the definition of this operation.
Definition 5 (Relinearization). Let c1 = (t̃1 , u1 ( x )) and c2 = (t̃2 , u2 ( x )) be two ciphertexts. The relinearization homomorphism is defined to be the ciphertext c1 + c2 T ( x ) = (t̃1 +
t̃2 T ( x ), u1 ( x ) + u2 ( x ) T ( x )).
Remark 6. In the BFV scheme, the relinearization homomorphism is implemented by the standard
polynomial addition and multiplication algorithms.
3.2.3. Rotation
Rotation is a homomorphic operation used in the BFV scheme to implement the power
operation efficiently. It can be used to implement a large class of homomorphic operations
on encrypted data. In the following, we give the definition of this operation.
Definition 6 (Rotation). Let c = (t̃, u( x )) be a ciphertext. The rotation homomorphism is defined
to be the ciphertext cr = (t̃, u( x )r ), where r is an integer.
Remark 7. In the BFV scheme, the rotation homomorphism is implemented by the standard
polynomial multiplication algorithm.
Remark 8. The rotation is sometimes called the “power operation”.
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3.3. Federated Learning
In this section, we briefly describe the federated learning (FL) framework. We refer
to [22,23] for more details.
Definition 7 (FL model). Let N be a positive integer, and X be a probability space. Let m be a
positive integer such that m < N, and P = { p1 , p2 , . . . , pm } be a collection of random variables
on X with pi ∈ L1 (X ) for i = 1, 2, . . . , m. The FL model consists of the following four algorithms:
•
•
•
•

Initialization algorithm: It takes the security parameter k as input, and outputs the global
model w0 ∈ Rn , where n is the number of free parameters in w0 .
Local training algorithm: It takes the global model wt ∈ Rn , a local dataset Di ∈ D , and a
positive integer t as inputs, and outputs a local model wit+1 ∈ Rn .
Upload algorithm: It takes the local model wit ∈ Rn , and a positive integer t as inputs, and
outputs a vector vit ∈ Rn .
Aggregation algorithm: It takes a set of vectors vit ∈ Rn , and a positive integer t as inputs,
and outputs the global model wt+1 ∈ Rn .

In the above definition, the integer t is called the training round. The global model wt
is a function of the training round t. The global model wt is trained by the local models wit ,
which are trained on the local datasets Di . The global model wt is trained on the aggregated
dataset ∪im=1 Di . The global model wt is initialized to be the global model w0 .
Remark 9. In the FL model, the local training algorithm, upload algorithm, and aggregation
algorithm can be implemented by any machine learning algorithm.
Remark 10. The global model wt can be trained on the aggregated dataset ∪im=1 Di using any
machine learning algorithm.
Remark 11. In the FL model, the global model wt is shared among all the participating clients, and
the local models wit are not shared among the clients.
4. System Model
This section gives a high-level system overview of the proposed BFV crypto-schemebased privacy-preserving federated learning COVID-19 detection training method. The
proposed privacy-preserving scheme is a two-phase approach: (1) local model training
at each client and (2) encrypted model weight aggregation at the server. In the local
model training phase, each client builds their local CNN-based DL model using their
local electronic health record dataset. The clients encrypt the model weights matrix using
the public key. In the second step, the server aggregates all clients’ encrypted weight
matrices and sends the final matrix to the clients. Each client decrypts the aggregated
encrypted weight matrix to update the model weights of their DL model. Figure 1 shows
the system overview.
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Figure 2 shows the CNN-based COVID-19 detection model used in the experiments.
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Figure 2. CNN-based COVID-19 detection model.

4.1. Notations
•
•
•
•

Boldface lowercase letters show the vectors (e.g., x);
JWK shows the ciphertext of a matrix W;
⊕ shows the homomorphic encryption-based addition, ⊗ homomorphic encryptionbased multiplication;
(key pub , key priv ) shows public/private key pairs.

4.2. Client Initialization
Algorithm 1 shows the overall process in the initialization phase. Each client trains
the local classifier, hi , with their private dataset Di . The trained model’s weight matrix, W,
is encrypted, JWK, and shared with the server
Algorithm 1 Model training in each client
Require: The dataset at client c: Dc = {(x, y)|x ∈ Rm , y ∈ R}im=0 , public key: Key pub
1: Xtrain , Xtest , ytrain , ytest ← train_test_split(D)
2: h ← global_model
3: h. f it( Xtrain , ytrain )
4: W ← ∅ // Create an empty matrix for the encrypted layer weights
5: for each layer ∈ h do
6:
JWK ← encrypt_ f ractional (layer.weights, key pub ) // Encrypt the layer weights (layer.weights ∈
Rm ) with public key.
7: end for
8: Return JWK // The encrypted weight matrix

4.3. Model Aggregation
The server collects all encrypted weight matrices, {JWK0 , · · · , JWKc }, from the clients.
It calculates the average weight value of each neuron in the encrypted domain. Algorithm 2
shows the overall process in the aggregation phase.
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Algorithm 2 Model aggregation at the server
Require: public key: Key pub , the number of clients: c, client model weights: H = {JWKi }ic=0
1: JWKaggr ← ∅
2: for each h ∈ H do
3:
for each JrowK ∈ h do
4:
JWKaggr ← JWKaggr ⊕ JrowK // Homomorphic addition
5:
end for
6: end for
7: for each JrowK ∈ JWKaggr do
8:
JrowK ← JrowK ⊗ c−1 // Homomorphic multiplication.
9: end for
10: Return JWKaggr // Return the aggregated weight matrix in the encrypted domain

4.4. Client Decryption
The last step is client decryption in which each client decrypts the aggregated and
encrypted weight matrix, JWKaggr , and updates their local model, h. Algorithm 3 shows the
overall process in the client decryption phase.
Algorithm 3 Client decryption
Require: private key: Key priv , encrypted aggregated weights: JWKaggr
1: h ← global_model
2: for each layer ∈ h do
3:
JrowK ← JWKaggr (layer ) // Get the corresponding row for layer
4:
layer ← decrypt_ f ractional (JrowK, key priv ) // Decrypt the row and update the layer weights
5: end for
6: h.save_model ( global_model ) // Save the aggregated model as global_model at client.

5. Results
5.1. Dataset
In this work, a COVID-19 radiography dataset collected in previous works related to
a COVID-19 detection model [24,25] was used. The dataset contains X-ray lung images
with four different classifications, which are COVID, Lung_OPACITY, Normal, and Viral
Pneumonia. In this work, we utilized two classifications, which are COVID and Normal,
focusing only on the COVID-19 detection machine learning process.
Samples of the dataset are depicted in Figures 3 and 4.

Figure 3. COVID-19 positive X-ray image dataset samples.

From the original dataset, we obtained the first 1000 records from each classification, with
80% of the sample used for the training set and the remaining 20% as the test set. The training
dataset was further split with 10% of the dataset as the train-validation dataset.
We obtained 1000 records for each classification with 800 records used as the training
dataset and 200 records used as the test dataset.
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Figure 4. COVID-19 negative X-ray image dataset samples.

5.2. Preprocessing
Data preprocessing performed in the work consists of data augmentation and rescaling for the training dataset, while only data rescaling was applied for the test dataset.
Data augmentation was necessary in order to provide data variety in the training dataset.
The dataset was rescaled by multiplying the pixel value with 1/255. This was aimed to
transform the pixel value range from [0, 255] to [0, 1] so that pixels were treated in the same
way.
6. Implementation
6.1. Experimental Setup
Table 2 shows the CNN model used to predict COVID-19 detection.
Table 2. Model summary.

Layer (Type)

Output

Shape

No. of Parameters

conv2d
max_pooling2d
conv2d_1
max_pooling2d_1
conv2d_2
max_pooling2d_2
conv2d_3
max_pooling2d_3
conv2d_4
max_pooling2d_4
conv2d_5
max_pooling2d_5
flatten
dense
dense_1
dense_2

(Conv2D)
(MaxPooling2D)
(Conv2D)
(MaxPooling 2D)
(Conv2D)
(MaxPooling 2D)
(Conv2D)
(MaxPooling 2D)
(Conv2D)
(MaxPooling 2D)
(Conv2D)
(MaxPooling 2D)
(Flatten)
(Dense)
(Dense)
(Dense)

(None, 254, 254, 32)
(None, 127, 127, 32)
(None, 125, 125, 32)
(None, 62, 62, 32)
(None, 60, 60, 32)
(None, 30, 30, 32)
(None, 28, 28, 64)
(None, 14, 14, 64)
(None, 12, 12, 64)
(None, 6, 6, 64)
(None, 4, 4, 128)
(None, 2, 2, 128)
(None, 512)
(None, 128)
(None, 64)
(None, 2)

896
0
9248
0
9248
0
18,496
0
36,928
0
73,856
0
0
65,664
8256
130

Total params: 222,722. Trainable params: 222,722. Non-trainable params: 0.

The implementation was developed with Python 3.8.8, using existing libraries. There were
standard libraries used, such as Keras and Tensorflow, which were used in the machine learning
processes; Numpy, which was used to process weight arrays and data structures; pickle, to
serialize exported weights; and most importantly, Pyfhel, which is used for homomorphic
encryption. Pyfhel [26] is basically a Python wrapper for Microsoft SEAL, which provides the
same functionalities as the Microsoft Simple Encrypted Arithmetic Library (SEAL).
Microsoft SEAL is a homomorphic encryption library developed by Microsoft, which was
released in 2015. The SEAL library implements both Brakerski–Fan–Vercauteren (BFV) [27,28]
and Cheon–Kim–Kim–Song (CKKS) [29] homomorphic encryption schemes and provides
standard SHE functions starting from encoding, key generation, encryption, decryption, additive,
multiplicative, and relinearization functions.
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In the Pyfhel library implementation, we implemented the BFV scheme and used predefined default values in the HE context parameters, but with exception to parameter sec.
Parameter sec is used to determine the bit-wise security level provided. At the time of writing,
there are two possible values—128 and 192. We experimented with these values and observed
the overall model performance in terms of time and accuracy. The parameter sec determines the
length of coefficient modulus (q) based on polynomial degree (n) parameter, as described in
the below Table 3 [30].
Table 3. Default pairs (n, q) for 128-bit and 192-bit security levels.

Bit-Length of Default q.
n

128-bit Security

192-bit Security

1024
2048
4096
8192
16,384
32,768

27
54
109
218
438
881

19
37
75
152
300
600

We have implemented our proposed protocols and the classifier training phase in Python
by using the Keras/Tensorflow libraries for the model building and the Microsoft SEAL library
for the somewhat homomorphic encryption implementation. To show the training phase time
performance of the proposed protocols, we tested the COVID-19 X-ray scans public dataset with
different numbers of clients and the ciphertext modulus, q = {128, 192}, which determines
how much noise can accumulate before decryption fails. Table 4 shows the dataset details.
Table 4. Dataset description.

Dataset

Rows

Label

Training

800
800

Negative
Positive

Test

200
200

Negative
Positive

The dataset is arbitrarily partitioned among each client (c ∈ {2, 3, 5, 7}), and then the
prediction performance results in the encrypted-domain are compared with the results of the
plain-domain.
6.2. Experimental Results
We first experimented with the COVID-19 detection model with no encryption and
federated learning. In this case, there is only one client observed. Table 5 shows the model
performance scores, and the running time was 599.169577s.
Table 5. Prediction result without federated learning.

Precision

Recall

F1 Score

Accuracy

0.868924

0.840000

0.836801

0.840000

We then applied federated learning in the model and observed the model performance
based on evaluation matrices. Table 6 shows the performance results of federated learning
without encryption.
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Table 6. Performance measurements: federated learning without encryption.

Number of Clients

2

3

5

7

Precision
Recall
F1 Score
Accuracy

0.872128
0.845000
0.842123
0.845000

0.865112
0.837500
0.834369
0.837500

0.859288
0.835000
0.832164
0.835000

0.850277
0.827500
0.824649
0.827500

We then continued our observation by adjusting the hyperparameter secbetween
values 128 and 192.
Table 7 shows the performance measurements of federated learning with encryption
level is 128.
Table 7. Performance measurements: federated learning with encryption sec = 128.

Number of Clients

2

3

5

7

Precision
Recall
F1 Score
Accuracy

0.867337
0.837500
0.834132
0.837500

0.857293
0.840000
0.838040
0.840000

0.853925
0.830000
0.827078
0.830000

0.869584
0.852500
0.850776
0.852500

Table 8 shows the performance measurements of federated learning with encryption
level is 192.
Table 8. Performance measurements: federated learning with encryption sec = 192.

Number of Clients

2

3

5

7

Precision
Recall
F1 Score
Accuracy

0.866735
0.840000
0.837030
0.840000

0.868924
0.840000
0.836801
0.840000

0.855624
0.832500
0.829732
0.832500

0.86800
0.84500
0.84254
0.84500

Apart from measuring the model performance with evaluation matrices, we also
measured total processing time, starting from model training at clients until the end of
the federated learning process, and prediction result using the aggregated model. Table 9
shows the processing time in federated learning with various numbers of clients.
Table 9. Running time in seconds.

Number of Clients Without Encryption Encryption (sec = 128) Encryption (sec = 192)
2
3
5
7

594.165448
647.963712
720.175786
948.704833

4333.672333
5124.841524
6777.249099
9223.281346

4765.874634
7504.239611
10,518.012003
13,277.904182

Below are histograms by evaluation matrices, accuracy, precision, recall, F1 score to
visualize influence of encryption and encryption key length to model performance. Figure 5
the prediction performance score with different metrics.
From the histograms above, we see that homomorphic encryption and its key length
variations do not have much influence to model performance.
We also used histogram to visualize running time growth against homomorphic
encryption and its key length variations. From Figure 6, it shows that running time
increased quite significantly with homomorphic encryption implemented. It also shows
that running time was also influenced by encryption length—the longer the key, the longer
the execution time.
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Figure 5. Prediction performance score with different metrics. (a) Precision. (b) Recall. (c) F1.
(d) Accuracy.

One last thing we observed was that the pickle file size of encrypted weights was
around 7 GB regardless of execution time.
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Figure 6. Running time in seconds.

7. Conclusions
Privacy-preserving has become an essential practice of healthcare institutions as
both the EU, and we, mandate it. Federated learning and homomorphic encryption will
play a critical role in maintaining data security and model training. By benefiting from
both techniques, the proposed model achieves competitive performance while there is a
significant trade-off for the execution time and the number of clients. In some cases, where
privacy-preserving is very crucial, for instance, in healthcare fields, the trade-off is very
acceptable.
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The classification metrics, i.e., accuracy, F1, precision, and recall, reached over 80%
using both encrypted and plain data for each federated learning case, which means that
homomorphic encryption, in this case, SHE, does not deteriorate model performance.
Privacy attacks will cause immense damage to the security and privacy of patient
information. This will hinder the advancement in healthcare using data-driven models.
Therefore, it is indispensable to take crucial steps to strengthen the safety of the information,
and the way data is processed. This study demonstrated that federated learning with
homomorphic encryption could successfully enhance data-driven models by eliminating
and minimizing the share of sensitive data. It is envisioned that this study could be helpful
for the scientists and researchers working on sensitive healthcare data in multi-party
computation settings.
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